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Abstract—We propose a novel framework for secure and
reliable authentication of Distributed Energy Resources to the
centralized secondary/tertiary control system of a DC MicroGrid
(MG), networked using the IEEE 802.11 wireless interface. The
key idea is to perform the authentication using power talk –
a powerline communication technique executed by the primary
control loops of the power electronic converters. In addition,
the scheme also promotes direct and active participation of
the control system in the authentication process, a feature not
commonly encountered in current networked control systems for
MicroGrids. The PLECS R©-based simulations verifies the viability
of the proposed solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the traditional AC power grid has been
subjected to unprecedented proliferation of flexible, small-
scale Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and smart loads,
many of which are direct current (DC) in nature, leading to
formation of self-sustainable low voltage DC clusters referred
to as MicroGrids (MG). In contrast to AC distribution systems,
DC MGs provide significant installation, operation and main-
tenance flexibility due to high penetration of renewable DERs
that are interfaced to the DC infrastructure through power
electronic converters [1], [2]. Specifically, the extensive use
of power electronic converters provides for implementation
of advanced control and optimization mechanisms in DC
MGs, where the feedback loop is typically closed via external
communication network [3].
The ongoing trend emphasizes the importance of the secu-
rity of the control system, particularly the security of the feed-
back loop, and raises concerns regarding the adequacy of exist-
ing communication technologies for the security challenges of
the evolving DC MG ecosystem [4]. Specifically, the control
feedback loop is commonly closed via off-the-shelf commu-
nication solutions such as IEEE 802.11 [5]. Even though the
current security specification of the standard, namely the IEEE
802.11i, is considered to be safe, a potentially vulnerable
point of failure in the security system is the initial handshake
procedure, which might prevent the DER units that aim to
join the control system from accessing the communication
resources, resulting in poor regulation and even instability.
In all current MG implementations, authentication by the
communication system automatically grants access to control
system information, i.e., access to control. This situation might
lead to undesired and potentially harmful circumstances in
existing and emerging MG systems, especially in tactical or
military applications, where a malicious entity may obtain
access to the communication system and thus compromise
MG operation. So far, there has been very little effort to design
secure control architecture in which the control system actively
participates in authentication and access control.
This paper proposes novel, robust networked control archi-
tecture for secure authentication of DER units, that employs re-
cent powerline communication (PLC) technique termed power
talk, and runs the initial handshake over the powerlines. Power
talk [6], [7], [8] is an in-band, low rate PLC solution, designed
originally for self-sustainable DC MGs that do not rely on
external communication systems. It modulates the information
into subtle deviations of the parameters of the primary droop
control of the DERs, which translate in information-carrying
deviations of the steady state voltage of the DC distribution
system. Using power talk, the handshake becomes effectively
invisible for the conventional attacker, as the attacker needs to
physically access the grid in order to perform the attack, which
is significantly more complicated and often impossible (e.g.,
MG systems for applications guarded by a safety perimeter).
Furthermore, the proposed scheme promotes active participa-
tion of the MG control system in the authentication procedure,
as it is embedded within the primary control loops, without
the use of any additional, external hardware, requiring only
software modifications of the power electronic converters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
state-of-the art security procedures used in IEEE 802.11 and
discusses their potentially weak points, with the emphasis on
the handshake procedure. Section III introduces the hierarchi-
cal MG control architecture, discusses possible cyber-attacks
and introduces the basics of power talk. Section IV presents
the secure authentication procedure. Section V verifies the vi-
ability of the advocated solution through PLECS R© simulation
of a realistic low voltage DC MG. Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. CRYPTOGRAPHIC HANDSHAKE OF IEEE 802.11
SYSTEMS
The IEEE 802.11 standard includes advanced security
mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the
communication channel. The most recent security specification
is IEEE 802.11i [9], whose security aspects are summarized
as follows.
The standard ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the
packets by means of the CCMP protocol, that is based on
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher. A shared
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Fig. 1: Representation of the four-way-handshake.
key, named Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), guarantees the
encryption between Station (STA) and Access Point (AP). A
second shared key, the Group Transient Key (GTK), is used
for multicast and broadcast traffic. The STA is provided with
the keys after having proved to be authorized, i.e., to know the
right Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The PMK can be derived
from a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) or by means of advanced au-
thentication mechanisms that involve an Authentication Server.
In any case, STAs have to indirectly prove the knowledge of
the PMK to the AP; this problem has been resolved by means
of a cryptographic handshake [10]. The handshake consists of
four messages, each requiring an Acknowledgement (ACK).
The protocol steps, depicted in Fig. 1, can be summarized
as: (h1) AP→STA containing the ANonce and its own MAC
address enabling the STA to compute the PTK, (h2) STA→AP
containing the CNonce and its own MAC address, enabling the
AP to compute the PTK, (h3) AP→STA containing the GTK,
and, (h4) STA→AP confirmation of the reception.
Besides the basic dictionary attack [11], particularly threat-
ening attack on the handshake is when a malicious attacker
impersonates the STA and sends invalid packets leading to
unsuccessful authentication [10] and disabling the STA from
accessing the communication resources. This situation may
result in poor regulation of the MG system, leading to per-
formance degradation and instability as the DER is prevented
from communicating and, thus, participating in the control and
optimization, c.f. [12].
III. CONTROL IN DC MICROGRIDS
A. Multiple-Bus DC MicroGrid Architecture
A DC MG is a collection of DERs and loads, connected
to distribution infrastructure that comprises set of buses
interconnected via distribution lines. The total number of
DERs is denoted with U , and they are indexed in the set
U = {0, ..., U − 1}. They use power electronic converters to
interface the distribution system, and their voltage and current
(i.e., power) outputs are locally regulated via several control
channels of different bandwidths. The total demand of the
aggregate load is denoted with d.
B. Hierarchical Control
The control architecture of the MG is summarized in Fig. 2.
The control plane is organized in a hierarchy, comprising fast
decentralized primary control, and slow centralized secondary
and tertiary control.1 In standard implementations, the primary
control uses only local measurements as feedback, i.e., it
does not require any exchange of information among remote
units. On the other hand, the feedback loop of the sec-
ondary/tertiary control is closed via external communication
system; thereby, each power electronic converter is assumed
to be pre-equipped with IEEE 802.11 modem, see Fig. 2. We
assume: (i) the communication is centralized, i.e., there is a
single AP and all DERs are associated with it, and (ii) the
central secondary/tertiary controller (CC) is collocated with
the AP in the same physical unit, see Fig. 2. Thus, besides
handling the secondary/tertiary control processes, the same
unit is also in charge of the authentication of DERs to the
communication network. Without loss of generality, assume
that the secondary/tertiary CC and AP reside in DER 0.
1) Primary control: A common primary control config-
uration is in the form of Voltage Source Converter (VSC).
VSC DERs regulate the electrical parameters and balance the
supply-demand to guarantee stability, based on local output
measurements, using the following law [1], [2], [13]:
vu = xu − ruiu, u ∈ U ,
where vu and iu are the bus output voltage and current, xu
is the reference voltage and ru is the virtual resistance. This
implementation is known as decentralized droop control. The
value vn serves as input reference to the inner primary control
loops, that operate with frequency ν, equal to the sampling
frequency of the converters’ ADC, see Fig. 2. The droop
controller controls xu and ru, where xu determines the voltage
rating of the system, while the ru determines the load sharing
among different DERs. In practice, the value of the virtual
resistance is set to enable proportional load sharing [2], [3].
Another primary control architecture is in the form of
Current Source Converter (CSC). CSC units do not participate
in output voltage regulation and are usually operated at their
individual maximum efficiency point using the Maximum
Power Point Tracking (MPPT) algorithm [2].
2) Secondary control: It is well known that under decen-
tralized primary droop control, the bus voltages vary with
changes in the load demand and the power generation capaci-
ties of the renewable DERs [2], [3]. Moreover, the load is not
ideally shared among different DERs due to mismatched line
admittances [13]. In this context, the role of the secondary
control is to alleviate the drawbacks of the decentralized
droop control and restore the bus voltages to a predefined and
optimized global reference (determined by the tertiary control)
and to foster proper load sharing. This is achieved by adding
correction offsets to the reference voltage control parameter
of the local droop controller, see Fig. 2. We assume that the
secondary control is centralized and implemented as follows:
1) DER u ∈ U , periodically (e.g., every 5 milliseconds)
sends a short message to the CC with payload [v˜u, i˜u]
1We adopt the centralized secondary/tertiary architecture for simplicity of
exposition. However, we note that the proposed solution can be easily applied
to the distributed case [5] with minor modifications.
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Fig. 2: Control diagram and flow of information in DC MG with centralized secondary/tertiary control and secure and reliable
power talk based DER authentication. The red blocks are the newly added software components.
with v˜u and i˜u denoting the local measurement of the
output bus voltage and current;
2) the CC computes the voltage restoration and proportional
load sharing offsets δxv and δxcu using Proportional-
Integral (PI) loops;
3) the CC sends unicast packet with payload [δxv, δxcu] to
DER u, u ∈ U ;
4) upon receiving the packet, each DER uses δxv, δxcu to
correct the local droop controllers:
v?u = xu + δx
v + δxcu − ruiu, u ∈ U .
After the load/generation change, the offsets δxv and δxcu
converge to stable values and remain fixed until the next
fluctuation. The modified droop control law provides a global
voltage regulation reference and fosters proportional load
sharing. Note that only VSC DERs participate in secondary
control voltage and current sharing regulation.
3) Tertiary control: The tertiary control runs with sig-
nificantly lower frequency than the secondary control (e.g.,
every 5 − 30 minutes [14]), optimizing the performance of
the system and generating the optimal references for the
lower control levels. The tertiary control objective depends on
the specific application. In our system, a generic centralized
tertiary control is implemented as follows:
1) DER u ∈ U periodically sends a message with generic
payload zu, u ∈ U to the CC;
2) the CC solves the application-specific optimization prob-
lem and generates the optimized global/local control
parameters;
3) the optimal parameters are sent to the DERs in a message
with payload qu, u ∈ U ;
4) the DERs follow the received CC directives and reset the
local control parameters which remain valid until new
ones are received.
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Fig. 3: Attacking the secondary control level via disabling
initial handshake.
C. Attacks on the control system via attacks on the wireless
interface
To motivate the development of our framework, we take a
closer look into two potential attacks on the secondary control.
Consider DC MG in which small subset of DERs are
operated in VSC mode, while the rest are operated in CSC
mode, see the right-hand side of Fig. 3. Such primary control
architectures are typical in state-of-the-art installations, where
the individual renewable DERs (e.g., solar panels) are operated
at their respective maximum efficiency points [1], [2]. A
known problem in such systems is the limited ability of the
controlling VSC DERs to restore and stabilize the voltage
around the global reference after frequent dramatic changes
in the renewable power capacity of the CSC DERs; this
decreases the overall system efficiency and might lead to
instability [2]. One possible solution is to configure the DERs
with dual mode capability, i.e., to switch between CSC and
VSC modes transparently [2]. Specifically, whenever the grid
voltage crosses predefined voltage thresholds, portion of the
CSC DERs switch to VSC primary control mode and ask
the CC to join the secondary control. To gain access to the
wireless communication resources, they are initially requested
to authenticate.
An attacker might attack the control system by 1) attacking
the handshake and disabling the authentication, which prevents
the newly switched VSC DERs from joining the secondary
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Fig. 4: Time organization of the proposed power talk-based DER authentication scheme.
control, see the left-hand side of Fig. 3, and 2) jamming the
wireless channel of one or several VSC DERs, including the
CC, that participate in secondary control [12]. Both types of at-
tacks result in poor voltage regulation, leading to performance
degradation and potential instabilities.
The solution presented in the paper addresses the first
type of attack (Fig. 3), by implementing the handshake over
parallel powerline communication interface based on power
talk, which is described in Section III-D. We also note that
the power talk interface can be easily adapted to address the
second type of attack, by allowing jammed units to send an
alarm to the CC. The CC can then act appropriately, e.g., by
sending directives to the jammed VSCs DERs via power talk
to switch back to CSC mode, and asking non-jammed CSCs to
switch to VSC mode and join the secondary control. Finally,
the power talk interface can be also used as a safe and secure
channel over which the VSC DERs can re-elect new CC in
case the wireless interface of the current CC is under attack.
Addressing these aspects is part of ongoing work.
D. Power Talk
Power talk is implemented on primary droop control level,
and requires the secondary control to be switched off during
its operation [6], [7], [8]. VSC DER u ∈ U modulates
information into the values of the local reference voltage
xu and virtual resistance ru droop control parameters, thus
inducing disturbances of the output voltages. At the same
time, droop controlled DERs also observe the steady state
bus voltage response. We say that the inputs to the power
talk multiple access channel are xu and ru, u ∈ U , while
the output observed by DER k 6= u is represented through the
disturbances of the output bus voltage. The power talk channel
is non-linear and requires full knowledge of the configuration
of the system, which makes it particularly challenging for
implementation [6], [8]. However, the main challenge and
impairment stems from the requirement for turning off the sec-
ondary control; this makes the steady state voltage susceptible
to random load variations which alter the output voltage of
the DERs in unpredictable manner. Large portion of the work
on power talk consist in designing viable strategies to mitigate
the effect of random load changes in various communication
scenario, such as one-way, broadcast, all-to-all full duplex, etc.
[6], [7], [8]. As detailed in the Section IV, here we employ a
basic variant, suitable for one-way communication where only
one transceiver pair is active at a time.
IV. SECURE AND ROBUST DER AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL BASED ON POWER TALK COMMUNICATION
Here we describe the scheme for secure and reliable power
talk based authentication of a DER to the external communica-
tion infrastructure. We label an “incoming” DER with U , and
we assume that it is connected to the MG via primary control
and does not participate in upper level control. DER U wishes
to join the set U , i.e., to actively participate in the regulation
and optimization of the MG. Prior to this, DER U should
be authenticated and granted permission to join the wireless
networking. The authentication is performed by the CC; the
control architecture of the DERs engaged in the handshake is
summarized in Fig. 2.
A. Protocol Organization
Fig. 4 depicts the time organization of the external wireless
and power talk interfaces; note all DERs physically connected
to the system are synchronized.2 The time axis of the wireless
interface is divided into secondary and tertiary control periods
of durations denoted with T sc, T tc, corresponding to the
sampling frequencies of the secondary and tertiary controllers,
respectively. Note that T sc  T tc.
2The synchronization is easy to achieve and maintain through the standard
techniques used in IEEE 802.11.
The power talk interface is based on a periodically repeating
pool of D ≥ 1 consecutive secondary control periods in which
the secondary control is turned off, see Fig. 4.3 We name
the periodic pool as power talk association request channel
(PTARCh), with duration T scD, occurring with frequency LT tc .
The PTARCh is used by any “incoming” VSC DER that
wants to join the upper level control, to send initial association
request to the CC. After receiving association request, the CC
keeps the secondary control off and allocates additional, on-
demand pool of R ≥ 1, consecutive secondary control periods
for execution of the actual handshake, establishing the on-
demand power talk handshake channel (PTHaCh), see Fig. 4.
Specifically, DER U , after physically connecting to the MG
through primary control and synchronizing with the power
talk interface, switches to VSC mode and waits until the next
occurrence of the PTARCh. Then, it sends association request
to the CC. The CC, after receiving the request successfully,
first sends an ACK and then the response message to to DER
U . DER U acknowledges the response which triggers the CC
to allocate additional power talk resources for the rest of the
handshake, namely the exchange of messages h1 to h4, see
Fig. 1, which happens in the PTHaCh channel of duration
T scR, see Fig. 4. We assume that the duration of a single
secondary control period can be expressed as T sc = ST pt,
where T pt denotes the duration of a single power talk slot and
S ≥ 1 is an integer.4
The described protocol relies on switching off the secondary
control for limited period of time, during which the system
becomes susceptible to voltage deviations, required by the
power talk (see subsection III-D). However, this also makes
the steady state voltage susceptible to load variations, repre-
senting the main communication impairment of the power talk
interface, as described next.
B. Specifics of the Power Talk PHY interface
We employ binary power talk introduced in [6]. Fig. 2 gives
an overview of the main functional blocks residing in the CC
and DER U when engaged in handshake via power talk. Label
the power talk transmitter in a power talk slot with i and the
receiver with j; when i = U then j = 0 and vice versa.
The handshake messages, represented as binary strings are
mapped into binary stream of reference voltage deviations in
the transmitters’ droop control loop, as follows:
0 ↔ xi − γ,
1 ↔ xi + γ,
The reference voltage deviation amplitude γ satisfies γxi  1,
see [6] for discussion on how to choose γ. The deviation ±γ
3The secondary control is turned off to enable establishment of the power
talk channel; during the off periods, the CC does not send secondary control
information and the DER u uses the last available δxv, δxcu.
4The duration T pt complies with the control bandwidth of the inner primary
control loops, such that the system reaches steady state in a power talk slot.
Typically S ≤ 10.
leads to deviations of the output voltage of the receiving DER:
0 ↔ vj −∆vj(0),
1 ↔ vj + ∆vj(1),
where vj , corresponding to γ = 0. The receiver, in each power
talk slot collects ν(T pts− τ) noisy steady state output voltage
samples, denoted with v˜j [n], then, it compares their average to
the threshold vj , and makes decision on the information bits:
if
1
νT pt
∑
n
v˜j [n] > vj , decide 1,
if
1
νT pt
∑
n
v˜j [n] < vj , decide 0.
Notice that τ denotes the transient interval in which the bus
reaches a steady state.
The above detection scheme is challenged by two major
impairments: (i) the susceptibility of the primary control
level to sporadic load variations during the periods in which
the secondary control is off, and (ii) sampling noise of the
converters’ ADC.
The impact of load variations on power talk has been
extensively studied [6], [8]. Specifically, in the above scheme,
a load change invalidates the detection threshold vj , which
might lead to burst of bit errors. A simple strategy to deal with
this impairment is to employ load change detection, in parallel
with power talk symbol transmission/detection, in both the
transmitter and the receiver [6].5 After detecting load change,
the transmission is paused, M “blank” power talk slots, i.e.,
slots with γ = 0 are inserted and the communicating DERs
to measure the new steady state output voltage level, which
is used as the new detection threshold. The viability of this
technique is verified in Section V. Note that under this strategy,
each load change increases the time necessary to complete the
handshake. We introduce the average handshake completion
time denoted with µ, defined as the average time needed to
complete the handshake, after the DER accesses the PTARCh.
We model the load changing process as a Poisson process with
arrival rate λ [8]. Then, the following expression for µ can be
derived [8]:
µ = (D +R)ST pt(1− e−λ + eλM ).
The expression shows that when the rate λ is significantly
lower than the power talk signaling rate, the dominant con-
tributing factor to µ is the total number of bits (D + R)S of
the handshake messages. The sampling noise of the converter
follows Gaussian distribution [15], i.e., v˜j [n] ∼ N (vj +
∆vj(b), σ
2) [8]. The bit error rate (BER) can be calculated
as:
Pe = 1− 1
2
erf
(
∆vj(1)
σ
√
2
)
− 1
2
erf
(
∆vj(0)
σ
√
2
)
.
An appropriate error correction code can be employed to
protect the handshake messages against noise-related errors.
5Both the transmitter and the receiver are able to determine whether a load
change has occurred by tracking their respective output voltage levels in each
power talk slot.
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Fig. 5: Realization of an authentication process.
V. RESULTS
We simulate a simple DC MG using PLECS R©. There are
U = 6 DER units, connected to a single bus in parallel
via distribution lines with resistances 0.2 Ω. The aggregate
resistive load of 1.5 Ω is also connected in parallel to the bus.
We use T sc = 5 ms and T tc = 5 min. The reference voltages
of the VSC DERs and the global grid voltage reference are
equal and set to xu = v? = 48 V. The virtual resistances of
all VSC DERs are set to 0.2 Ω and are kept fixed. Given the
above system parameters, the transient response time of a step
change of the reference voltage is estimated to be τ = 2.35 ms.
The wireless interface is IEEE 802.11n. Using Wireshark
and a compatible Wi-Fi interface, we capture the handshake
messages and map their binary versions directly onto the
power talk interface. The length of the messages in bytes is 114
for the Association Request, 93 for the Association Response,
177 for h1, 177 for h2, 211 for h3, 155 for h4 and 32 for
ACKs. The ADC sampling noise standard deviation is denoted
with η = 8.58 · 10−2. Thus, the standard deviation of the
power talk samples in each power talk slot can be calculated
as σ = η√
ν(T pt−τ) .
We first demonstrate and verify the technical feasibility of
the proposed authentication scheme. We use uncoded power
talk modulation, i.e., we directly map the handshake binary
representations of the messages to the power talk interface.
The CC receives the association request packet from DER
U in the PTARCh starting at t = 3 s. Fig. 5 depicts the
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Fig. 6: Realization with a load variation.
output currents of the DERs and grid voltage during and after
the handshake. Before authorization, it is clear that DER U ,
being connected to the MG only through primary control, does
not participate into secondary control regulation and its output
current is not contributing proportionally to the load. After the
handshake ends and the secondary control becomes switched
on, we observe that the output current of DER U quickly
becomes aligned with the output currents of the other DERs,
verifying that the authentication was successful and that DER
U joined the secondary control.
Fig. 6 illustrates a handshake during which a load change
occurs, in t = 15 s. After resetting the detection threshold,
the handshake resumes. Upon successful authorization to DER
U and turning the secondary control on, we observe that
the load is proportionally shared and the voltage is restored
to its global reference. Taking into account that the load
changes rather infrequently compared to the signaling rate
of power talk [6], [8], sporadic load changes in the power
talk channels can be efficiently mitigated using the detection
reset strategy with negligible impact on the overall duration
of the power talk periods. Moreover, the impact of any load
change that occurs during the void PTARChs, i.e., when no
DER sends association request, will be quickly eliminated after
the secondary control is switched on, restoring the voltage to
its global reference and fostering proportional current sharing.
Figs. 5 and 6 also illustrate that the handshake can take
up several seconds to complete via power talk which is a
result of the fundamental fact that power talk is a narrowband
10-10
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Fig. 7: Bit error rate of the power talk interface as function of
γ and T pt.
communication technique. During the handshake period, if a
load change occurs, the operating point will be suboptimal
as the system is governed only by the primary control.
However, we note that, as a proof of concept, the figures
are derived using the actual handshake messages from IEEE
802.11 standard, which is a high-rate wireless interface with
the symbol durations that are only fractions of microsecond.
If the structure and length of the handshake messages and
possibly the complete handshake procedure were redesigned
to match the features of the power talk interface, the duration
of the procedure could be significantly shortened. This would
also significantly reduce the fraction of time during which the
system is susceptible to load variations.
Finally, Fig. 7 depicts the BER as a function of the reference
voltage perturbation amplitudes γ and the duration of the
power talk slot T pt. Clearly, the impact of the sampling noise
becomes negligible as γ and T pt increase. Remarkably, already
with γ = 0.01 (i.e., 0.02% of v?) volts and T pt = 0.01 s, the
BER falls below 10−7, implying that the power talk interface
can be used in conjunction with simple error correction codes
with negligible redundancy and low complexity.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the MG control is simply placed on top of an existing
communication technology, it will also inevitably inherit the
corresponding security threats. According to this paradigm,
adopted by previous works related to MG security, the system
should include countermeasures against any known security
vulnerability, to enable reliable and secure operation of the
control system.
In this paper we show that if the communication is se-
cured using a non-conventional channel, i.e., the grid itself,
it becomes safe against traditional cyber-attacks. In particular,
we modeled and demonstrated an authentication scheme for
IEEE 802.11 systems based on power talk. Its robustness
stems from the fact that the initial handshake can be observed
and altered by only being physically connected to the grid.
Moreover, power talk can play a pivotal role in the overall
security, e.g., by reporting communication outages of the
primary channel and by distributing its encryption keys. These
topics are included in our ongoing work.
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